








“Fiscal Positions and Government Bond Yields in the OECD”

Joseph Gruber and Steve Kamin
Federal Reserve Board
April 29, 2011


The views in this presentation are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Federal Reserve System.

Fiscal Balances for G-7 Countries



*OECD Economic Outlook December 2009

Government Net Debt for G-7 Countries



*OECD Economic Outlook December 2009

Key Question:

- Fiscal positions have deteriorated. What is the likely impact on bond yields?










Fiscal Positions and Interest Rates

- A number of channels link fiscal positions and interest rates.
 - Crowding out.
 - Portfolio Balance.
 - Default Risk.
 - Inflation Expectations – Debt Monetization.



Long-term Interest Rates for G-7 Countries



*OECD Economic Outlook December 2009

Figure 4: Change in Long Term Interest Rate and Fiscal Balances





Figure 5: Change in Long Term Interest Rate and Net Debt



Issues in Estimation

- Problem is that both fiscal policy and interest rates are endogenous to the cycle.
 - Fall in GDP leads to lower fiscal balances and lower interest rates resulting in positive empirical relationship that obscures negative impact.



Recent Lit.

- Laubach (2009):
 - Examine 5-year ahead fiscal projections and interest rates.
 - Beyond the cycle – avoid endogeneity.
- ECB Studies:
 - Nickel, Rother, and Rülke (2009) and Attinasi, Checherita, and Nickel (2009)
 - Examine spreads between countries subject to similar macro shocks.



Our research:

- Similar to Laubach,
 - Utilize two-year ahead forecasts of fiscal variables in order to avoid endogeneity.
- but different:
 - Using full panel data set of OECD countries.
 - Allows us to examine additional factors (spillovers).
- Use coefficients to provide up-to-date estimates of impact of fiscal deterioration on sovereign yields



Our Approach:

- **Dependent Variable: 10-year sovereign bond yield.**
 - Long-term yields less correlated with the cycle.
- **Fiscal Variables**
 - Two-year ahead fiscal balances and net debt from OECD Economic Outlooks.
 - Example: 2007 Q4 Interest rate vs. Dec. 2007 Economic Outlook projection for 2009 balance.



Control Variables

- Addition Controls for the Cycle:
 - Short-Term Interest Rates.
 - GDP growth and Inflation.
 - Two-Year ahead forecasts from OECD.
 - Forecasts might hold more information for 10-year rates than current values.
- Lagged Long-term Rates
 - Persistence in interest rates.



Our Methodology

- Annual Panel Regressions (1988-2006)
- Samples:
 - OECD – 19 Countries.
 - G-7.
- Fixed Period Effects.
 - Savings Glut
- Fixed Country Effects.
 - Institutional arrangements, i.e. pension regulation.
Creditworthiness.



Table 1: Baseline Regressions

	Full Panel				G-7 Countries			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Short-term IR	0.314 11.015	0.317 9.938	0.237 5.663	0.276 8.145	0.325 5.849	0.317 6.047	0.337 5.150	0.314 4.058
Long-term IR(lag)	0.379 8.233	0.365 7.244	0.445 7.767	0.305 7.025	0.369 3.582	0.338 3.293	0.379 3.616	0.257 2.922
GDP	0.091 1.683	0.104 1.690	0.086 1.666	0.110 2.059	0.285 2.873	0.268 2.865	0.320 2.918	0.231 2.755
Inflation	0.210 3.422	0.237 3.545	0.184 2.879	0.197 3.065	0.210 2.098	0.237 2.253	0.253 1.937	0.326 3.460
Gross Debt	0.004 2.436				0.010 3.142			
Net Debt		0.004 2.135				0.012 3.376		
Primary Balance			-0.035 -2.119				-0.108 -2.328	
Structural Balance				-0.055 -2.430				-0.112 -2.462
#Obs	347	319	344	276	140	140	133	105
R ²	0.975	0.975	0.968	0.965	0.973	0.974	0.972	0.971
SER	0.449	0.447	0.457	0.348	0.494	0.486	0.498	0.379

First 4 columns represent entire sample. Second 4 columns represent G7 countries only.
Interest rate variables are contemporaneous. All other variables are 2-year ahead forecasts.
Panel regression with unreported constant as well as period and cross-sectional fixed effects.
19 cross-sections and 20 periods (1988 - 2007).
t-statistic reported underneath coefficient
Bold indicates signifiacne at the 10 percent level.
G7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States and United Kingdom

Comparison to Previous Studies

- Laubach (2009):
 - 1 percentage point increase in fiscal deficit/GDP boosts U.S. 5-year forward yield 20-29 basis points
 - 1 percentage point increase in fiscal debt/GDP boosts forward yield 3-4 bp
- We find in long-run, using G7 results:
 - 1 p.p. increase in fiscal deficit : 17 bp
 - 1 p.p. increase in fiscal debt : 2 bp



Robustness Checks

- Current rather than Forecasted variables.
 - Significant impacts although smaller than with forecasted variables.
 - Prospective fiscal policy more important for long-term rates than current policy (although the two are clearly correlated).



Table 2: Contemporaneous Independent Variables

	Full Panel				G-7 Countries			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Short-term IR	0.310 10.005	0.322 9.688	0.231 5.600	0.287 8.156	0.283 4.741	0.287 4.807	0.293 4.445	0.265 3.296
Long-term IR(lag)	0.417 7.737	0.416 6.996	0.496 7.982	0.308 6.179	0.463 3.986	0.456 3.927	0.495 4.327	0.377 3.431
GDP	-0.006 -0.221	-0.005 -0.154	-0.022 -1.253	0.000 -0.021	-0.040 -0.779	-0.035 -0.736	0.014 0.309	0.018 0.399
Inflation	0.028 1.335	0.026 1.164	0.046 2.061	0.055 2.259	0.049 1.521	0.049 1.564	0.093 2.288	0.137 2.829
Gross Debt	0.001 0.585				0.003 1.223			
Net Debt		0.002 0.875				0.005 1.793		
Primary Balance			-0.022 -1.545				-0.077 -2.448	
Structural Balance				-0.061 -3.350				-0.078 -2.501
#Obs	347	319	344	276	140	140	133	105
R ²	0.973	0.973	0.971	0.965	0.970	0.970	0.970	0.967
SER	0.466	0.470	0.466	0.351	0.525	0.523	0.513	0.406

First 4 columns represent entire sample. Second 4 columns represent G7 countries only.

All variables are contemporaneous

Panel regression with unreported constant as well as period and cross-sectional fixed effects.

19 cross-sections and 20 periods (1988 - 2007).

t-statistic reported underneath coefficient

Bold indicates significance at the 10 percent level.

G7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States and United Kingdom

Robustness Checks

- 5-year ahead 5-year rate (Laubach's)
 - Remove the front end of the curve – Focus on the less cyclical.
 - Same size effects – But not significant.



Table 3: 5-year 5-year Forward Interest Rates

	G-5 Countries 10-year Rate				G-5 Countries Forward Rate			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Short-term IR	0.238 5.567	0.235 5.726	0.224 4.804	0.187 3.526	0.048 0.907	0.040 0.792	0.080 1.526	0.100 1.074
Long-term IR(lag)	0.383 5.160	0.361 4.900	0.379 4.747	0.464 4.265	0.560 5.845	0.540 5.588	0.621 5.659	0.513 4.100
GDP	0.174 3.215	0.162 3.080	0.159 2.718	0.107 1.747	0.122 1.284	0.116 1.290	0.169 1.577	0.251 1.741
Inflation	0.063 1.105	0.083 1.375	0.040 0.692	0.184 2.682	0.112 1.206	0.127 1.385	0.126 1.310	0.069 0.454
Gross Debt	0.005 2.947				0.005 1.517			
Net Debt		0.006 3.040				0.006 1.564		
Primary Balance			-0.028 -1.428				-0.060 -1.472	
Structural Balance				-0.069 -2.234				-0.083 -1.538
#Obs	95	95	90	70	95	95	90	70
R ²	0.989	0.989	0.988	0.984	0.957	0.958	0.959	0.949
SER	0.291	0.289	0.299	0.281	0.510	0.508	0.500	0.515

Interest rate variables are contemporaneous. All other variables are 2-year ahead forecasts.

Panel regression with unreported constant as well as period and cross-sectional fixed effects.

5 cross-sections and 19 periods (1988 - 2006).

t-statistic reported underneath coefficient

Bold indicates significance at the 10 percent level.

G5 include Canada, Germany, Japan, United States and United Kingdom

Robustness Check

- Inflation may be endogenous to fiscal policy.
 - Including inflation may induce a downward bias in the estimated impact of fiscal policy.
- Removing inflation does not significantly change the results.
 - Suggests changing inflation expectations not the relevant channel.



Table 4: Removing Inflation

	Full Panel				G-7 Countries			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Short-term IR	0.321 10.133	0.331 9.191	0.233 5.216	0.285 7.666	0.345 5.650	0.339 5.786	0.350 4.893	0.343 3.842
Long-term IR(lag)	0.395 7.949	0.394 6.970	0.476 7.748	0.301 6.699	0.394 3.638	0.373 3.414	0.418 3.809	0.270 2.856
GDP	0.059 1.031	0.075 1.161	0.081 1.551	0.109 1.964	0.249 2.650	0.224 2.535	0.267 2.481	0.242 2.857
Inflation								
Gross Debt	0.002 1.330				0.009 3.023			
Net Debt		0.002 1.261				0.011 3.125		
Primary Balance			-0.024 -1.575				-0.092 -2.003	
Structural Balance				-0.047 -2.106				-0.095 -2.235
#Obs	347	319	344	276	140	140	133	105
R ²	0.973	0.973	0.970	0.964	0.972	0.972	0.970	0.968
SER	0.465	0.468	0.470	0.356	0.506	0.501	0.514	0.402

First 4 columns represent entire sample. Second 4 columns represent G7 countries only.
Interest rate variables are contemporaneous. All other variables are 2-year ahead forecasts.
Panel regression with unreported constant as well as period and cross-sectional fixed effects.
19 cross-sections and 20 periods (1988 - 2007).
t-statistic reported underneath coefficient
Bold indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
G7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States and United Kingdom

Table 5: Projected Inflation as Dependent Variable

	Full Panel				G-7 Countries			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Short-term IR	0.047	0.054	0.047	0.063	0.098	0.100	0.091	0.060
	1.431	1.476	1.699	2.327	2.583	2.623	2.348	1.120
Inflation (lag)	0.348	0.352	0.680	0.473	0.370	0.366	0.356	0.355
	4.485	4.141	8.238	6.638	2.902	2.883	2.768	3.240
GDP	-0.044	-0.005	0.046	0.031	-0.063	-0.071	-0.097	0.057
	-0.560	-0.056	0.608	0.435	-0.488	-0.558	-0.781	0.490
Gross Debt	-0.005				-0.001			
	-2.226				-0.207			
Net Debt		-0.004				-0.002		
		-1.977				-0.636		
Primary Balance			-0.009				0.032	
			-0.270				1.015	
Structural Balance				-0.020				0.028
				-0.907				1.055
#Obs	334	305	353	281	133	133	133	105
R ²	0.805	0.802	0.866	0.848	0.880	0.880	0.881	0.857
SER	0.569	0.545	0.653	0.409	0.518	0.517	0.515	0.391

First 4 columns represent entire sample. Second 4 columns represent G7 countries only.

Interest rate variables are contemporaneous. All other variables are 2-year ahead forecasts.

Panel regression with unreported constant as well as period and cross-sectional fixed effects.

19 cross-sections and 19 periods (1989 - 2007).

t-statistic reported underneath coefficient

Bold indicates significance at the 10 percent level.

G7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States and United Kingdom

Spillovers



Table 10: Impact of the Debts and Deficits of Others

	Full Panel				G-7 Countries			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Short-term IR	0.387 11.665	0.375 9.867	0.328 8.215	0.488 9.863	0.388 6.919	0.361 6.420	0.380 6.518	0.512 6.372
Long-term IR(lag)	0.339 9.431	0.304 7.516	0.378 9.687	0.150 3.387	0.339 5.672	0.326 5.344	0.331 5.603	0.155 2.156
GDP	0.389 4.230	0.402 4.236	0.330 3.793	0.544 5.742	0.602 3.943	0.573 3.868	0.585 4.096	0.608 4.313
Inflation	0.406 5.163	0.403 4.907	0.394 4.792	0.351 3.174	0.328 2.541	0.359 2.758	0.322 2.320	0.309 1.890
Gross Debt	0.011 3.104				0.012 2.634			
Net Debt		0.010 3.170				0.013 2.554		
Primary Balance			-0.075 -2.862				-0.117 -3.025	
Structural Balance				-0.125 -3.325				-0.167 -3.333
Foreign Gross	-0.003 -0.491				-0.006 -0.581			
Foreign Net		-0.018 -1.778				-0.015 -1.044		
Foreign Primary			0.107 3.018				0.087 1.766	
Foreign Structural				-0.546 -6.943				-0.482 -5.001
#Obs	347	319	344	276	140	140	133	105
R ²	0.920	0.920	0.904	0.859	0.929	0.931	0.925	0.907
SER	0.777	0.779	0.822	0.684	0.745	0.738	0.759	0.635

Table 12: Marginal Impact of Fiscal Variables

Country	Change in Net Debt (% of GDP)* 2007-2015	Change in Structural Balance (% of GDP)* 2007-2015	Estimated Change in Bond Yields	
			Net Debt & Structural Balance Model	Structural Balance Model
(Effects are measured in basis points)				
Canada	9	-0.8	16	
France	25	1.3	-5	
Germany	12	-1.2	22	
Italy	12	-0.6	12	
Japan	72	-4.8	90	
UK	38	1.4	2	
US	42	-3.4	62	

*Source: October 2010 World Economic Outlook

Conclusions

- Deficits and Debt increase long-term rates.
- Caveats:
 - Not a good estimate of sovereign risk.
- Extensions:
 - Substitute corporate rates to check crowding out.
 - Control for external vs. internal debt holding.

