SOVEREIGN DEBT AND BANKING CHALLENGES FOR SPAIN

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Summary

1. Macro environment and debt problems

2. Debt problems and bank capital: recent developments in Europe affecting Spain

3. The necessary steps in Spain and the additional efforts required for the banking sector
1. Macro environment and debt problems

• After the bail-out of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, countries such as Italy or Spain are concentrating most of the attention in Europe in what the so-called sovereign debt crisis is concerned.

• In Spain, as in other EU member states, the economic recovery has weakened and there are symptoms that the country may face recession in the next few quarters. According to preliminary estimates of the Spanish Statistical Office (INE), real GDP was 0% in the 2011Q3 (0.8% year-on-year).

• Although the official estimates is that Spain will grow around 0.7% in 2012, most economic analysts and forecasters expect zero economic growth or even recession in 2012 which, in turn, implies significant risks to Spain’s fiscal consolidation efforts.
The worsening of economic perspectives can be, to some extent, related to the persistent economic governance problems in Europe. In particular, the difficulties in designing a new aid programme for Greece and the recent political and economic tensions in Italy have prompted a renewed process of instability.

European countries offer different mixes of public debt/GDP ratio and budget deficit. As shown in Figure 1, the main problem for Spain in this front is cumulative budget deficit while debt/GDP ratio is relatively lower than other euro area counterparts.
Figure 1. Public Debt/GDP and cumulative budget deficit (2010-2012e)
In this context, the main efforts are being concentrated on fiscal consolidation and economic and financial reforms. It should be noted, however, that the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area has interacted negatively with the situation of the banking sector and this interaction is reflected in the low issuance of bank debt and the fears of investors. The problem has implications not only for Europe but also elsewhere. For example, as shown in Figure 2, the foreign claims of US banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain are large ($725 bln).

Figure 2. US Bank exposure to GIIPS (2011Q1)
2. Debt problems and bank capital: recent developments in Europe affecting Spain

• The worsening of financial conditions and the increase in bond yields during September and October 2011, led to new agreements at the European summit of EU Heads of State or Government on 26 October. These agreements can be summarized in three:
  – (1) defining the burden for the Greece case, including a voluntary acceptance by the private sector of a nominal discount of 50% on Greek debt;
  – (2) the enlargement of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF); and
  – (3) a programme to recapitalize European banks.

• The recapitalization plans were based on calculations made by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and involved an increase of the Core Tier 1 capital ratio to 9% for the Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). It also includes a process of “marking to market” all sovereign debt exposures. As shown in Table 1, bank capital needs for Spain where estimated in Eur 26.1 bln while those of Germany and France together were set at Eur 14 bln.
This was, somehow, surprising given the market performance of some French and German banks in recent months. It was also surprising to see that mark-to-market only affected sovereign debt while other securitizations and debt exposures (i.e. loans to developers & land in Spain) are not required to be marked-to-market.

Table 1. Estimated capital needs according to the European Banking Authority (data as of Sep. 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Estimated target capital buffer</th>
<th>Sovereign capital buffer*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT (1)</td>
<td>2,938</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE (2)</td>
<td>4,143</td>
<td>5,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY</td>
<td>3,587</td>
<td>3,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>5,184</td>
<td>7,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>26,161</td>
<td>6,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>8,844</td>
<td>3,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR (3)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>14,771</td>
<td>9,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO (4)</td>
<td>1,312</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>7,804</td>
<td>4,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>1,359</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106,447</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The sovereign capital buffer is indicative and can already be covered by existing CT1 capital if the CT1 ratio exceeds 9.

Amounts are in million Euros.
As the lack of resolution for sovereign debt problems in the euro area follows, many banks are making efforts to reduce their exposures on public debt and this is implying more pressure on bond yields and even (as shown in Figure 3 for Italy) a decoupling of sovereign debt and bank debt CDS curves.

Figure 3. Sovereign debt and bank debt CDS curves in Italy

Source: Markit
• It is worthwhile noting that all the solutions that are being proposed in the euro area are mostly based on fiscal austerity and bank solvency requirements. However, all these initiatives taken together will not benefit credit flows and will make difficult that banks contribute to financing and investment over the next few years.

• As shown in Figure 4, the historical experience suggests that credit is severely reduced in the short-run following the implementation of stricter bank solvency regulations. This may be particularly harmful for countries as Spain where bank credit to the private sector is key for investment and growth.
Figure 4. Bank capital regulations and credit growth in the world.
3. The necessary steps in Spain and the additional efforts required for the banking sector

- Given the difficult environment described above, Spain will have to face significant challenges in the near future and the banking sector will be one of the most important. Even if this note mainly concentrate on banking reforms, Spain will have to face an ample set of reforms, as summarized in Diagram 1, including:
  - i) Improving competitiveness and fostering economic growth by enhancing productivity instead of cutting spending in key sectors;
  - ii) making significant advances in the banking reform by solving the problem of asset impairment that represents one of the main worries for foreign investors;
  - iii) designing and implementing a more ambitious labor reform;
  - iv) setting a modern and more meaningful education policy;
  - v) improving the communication of all the reforms to the society so that all parties can be part of a very tough transition coming over
Diagram 1. Key reforms for the Spanish economy

Fostering economic growth by enhancing productivity and competitiveness → Make significant advances in the banking reform by solving the asset impairment problems → Ambitious labor market reforms

A substantial change in education policies → Improving communication to the society
• Although all these reforms are very important, probably the most urgent problems in Spain (together with unemployment) are those related to the banking sector. As shown in Figure 5, bank lending to the private sector decreased by 3% on average from June 2010 to June 2011 with construction & property development (-7.6%) and households and mortgage loans (-7%) being the most negatively affected.

• Importantly, the lower chart in Figure 5 reveals that even if lending to construction & property development has declined, the doubtful loans related to this sector are growing again in 2011 at a fast path. This reveals the dynamic nature of the bank asset impairment problem and it suggests that Spanish banks have been refinancing this type of loans and these are becoming non-performing faster.
Figure 5. Bank lending and doubtful assets in Spain (2008-2011)
• **What has been done so far in Spain?** As shown in Diagram 2, Spain has been developing one of the most ambitious and intense reforms in the banking sector. While the focus on other European countries has been on recapitalization (with almost no restructuring of the banking sector), in Spain the primary objective has been to undertake bank restructuring first and bank recapitalization afterwards. The aim of the recapitalisation of the banking sector was that all Spanish banks should have a core capital ratio of, at least, 8% (10% if they were not an stock company and hence, had difficult access to equity markets as some savings banks had).

• However, as Diagram 2 shows, the new EBA capital requirements may force Spain to make additional efforts since the EBA now requires a core Tier 1 capital ratio of 9% to SIFIs (while in Spain is 8%). Ironically, it is very happening that markets are requiring, anyway a 9% for any bank, no matter if it is a SIFI or not.
Diagram 2. The reform of the banking sector in Spain

Until October 2011:
1) Bank restructuring
2) Recapitalization: less requirements on Sifis, more requirements on those with more difficult access to equity markets

From October 2011:
1) More restructuring?
2) Recapitalization: more requirements on Sifis, less on smaller banks.
- Four years since the crisis started, the fundamental problem for the Spanish banking sector is still the same one: the asset impairment problem has not yet been clearly solved. The latest Financial Stability Report of the Bank of Spain (November 2011) has shown that the troubled exposure (doubtful assets, foreclosures and standard loans under surveillance) linked to real estate development amounts Eur 176 billion, which is 52% of the total exposure to real estate development. This volume of troubled exposure represents 11.4% of the credit portfolio (credit to the resident private sector in business in Spain, including, for this purpose, foreclosed assets) and 5.2% of consolidated assets. However, it would be convenient to know, to what extent, these loans are still deteriorating (as economic conditions do) and what are the implications for banks’ balance sheets and asset valuations.

- As shown in Figure 6, there seems to be a persistent difference between the solvency reported by Spanish financial institutions and the perceptions of investors. This difference generates a gap between regulatory capital and the capital that investors perceived that it is needed to cover the potential risk. As long as this information asymmetry is not corrected with additional information disclosure and further action to face the asset impairment problem, the perception on the solvency of the Spanish banking sector will continue to be negatively affected.
Figure 1. A roadmap for financial stability in Spain: regulation, investors’ perceptions and bank recapitalization

- **Regulatory capital**
- **Stated solvency of Spanish banks**
- **Bank solvency perception by investors**

Capital needs = differences in perceptions

Before the crisis

Crisis and restructuring

Recapitalization