

Reported financial statements feed the regulatory process and are the anchor of the publicly available information set

| Bank Balance Sheet | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| Assets: | Liabilities: |
| Cash & Due From Banks | Deposits |
| | -Non-Interest Bearing |
| Investment Securities | -Interest Bearing |
| Loans | ST Liabilities |
| | -Fed Funds |
| | -Repos |
| MSRs & Other Assets | -Other Short-term Liabilities |
| | LT Subordinated Debt |
| | Equity |

Depiction of underlying real bank

How the underlying economic reality is measured matters!

Bank opacity can create uncertainty



Bank Regulators




Bank Managers



- Creditors
- Equity investors
- Counterparties
- Taxpayers

Drivers of opacity: The accounting depiction of reality

Bank's Financial Reporting




Accounting rule changes post crisis

- Accounting for securitizations: QSPE's eliminated
- Proposed new rules for recognition and measurement of financial assets and financial liabilities
 - ◆ The contractual cash flow characteristics of the asset
 - ◆ The entity's business model for managing the asset
- Proposed change to loan loss accounting:
 - ◆ Replace incurred loss model with "current expected credit loss" (CECL) model.
 - ◆ Under this model, allowance for loan losses reflects management's current estimate of the contractual cash flows that the company does not expect to collect over the *entire life* of the loan.

Accounting discretion is likely higher under this new regime!

Drivers of accounting opacity




Bank opacity and discretion in loan loss provisioning

- **Delayed Expected Loss Recognition (DELIR):** Known expected loan losses are not recognized in current provisions, but carried forward to future periods.
- Significant cross-sectional variation in DELR across U.S. banks

⇒ provisioning not directly tied to true performance of the loan portfolio
⇒ overhang of unrecognized expected losses carry forward
⇒ bank capital mingles unrecognized expected losses with economic capital

Reported capital



Bushman & Williams (2013): Delayed Expected Loss Recognition & The Risk Profile of Banks

Consistent with *DELR* reducing transparency & increasing uncertainty over fundamentals:

- Stock market liquidity of high *DELR* banks decreases relatively more during downturns.
- Liquidity of high *DELR* banks co-moves relatively more with aggregate market liquidity, especially during economic downturns.

=> High *DELR* banks simultaneously become more opaque and face increased equity financing frictions!

Delayed Expected Loss Recognition & The Risk Profile of Banks

During recessions:


- Higher *DELR* banks have higher risk of severe drop in equity value;
- Distress at High *DELR* banks => significant increase in tail risk of severe drop in equity value of the ***banking system***.

When many banks simultaneously delay expected loss recognition in good times


⇒ group members simultaneously face consequences of opacity, loss overhangs and financing frictions during downturns.

⇒ *DELR* acts like a systematic risk factor where *DELR* banks as a “herd” are negatively impacted and transmit pain to the economy.

Profit Pressure & Discretionary Accounting Choices



Accounting discretion does not occur in a vacuum



- Shift Revenue Mix towards Non-interest Sources
- Ease Lending Standards
- Increase Leverage/Lower Tier1 capital