

# Discussion of “Securities Financing . . .” Breach and King

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Yale and NBER

# New Evidence on Securities Financing

- More evidence/data on opaque markets is welcome.
- First authors to use this survey data.

# Data




- Analogous to Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey—substitute dealer bank for commercial bank.
- Survey BDs about “**lending to clients collateralized by securities**”.
- Quarterly data over 2010Q2-2017Q4.
- Seven asset classes: agency MBS, HY bonds, IG bonds, equities, ABS CMBS, RMBS.
- Ask about spread, haircut, maximum maturity, maximum amount.
- Average borrower and most-favored borrower.
- No info about identities of DBs.

# What moves lending terms? Some Candidates


- Returns and realized vol
- Issuance
- Trading volume
- Financing volume
- Fails to deliver
- Amihud liquidity
- Tri-party data

time t




## Repo



## Securities Financing



time t + 3m



## Not About Repo

- Repo is how BDs finance themselves. Pick up the liquidity premium by producing private money.
- E.g., BDs pay, say 3% overnight and provide collateral; BD gets the return on the collateral, say 6%.
- Not clear how much matched book there really is.

## Result #1


- “. . . Dealers do not change securities-financing terms very frequently.”

% dealers changing terms	Ave.	0.16	0.08	0.08	0.10
	MF	0.14	0.08	0.09	0.11

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- Haircuts designed to fully secure the loan, so nothing changes if the loan is then “riskless” in “normal” times.
- When do the changes happen? When market conditions change.

*A. Averaging across all asset classes*





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## Result #2

- “When terms do change . . . they all tend to change together.”
- Change favorably or unfavorably? Mostly tighter over sample period.

## Result #3

- “. . . The single factor that emerges as most important is the liquidity of the underlying markets.”
- Aside from the Amihud measure, not clear what “liquidity” is here.
- Changes in issuance?, TED spread?

## Result #4

- “For all counterparties, ‘competition’ is the most frequently cited reason for changing terms.”
- “Apart from that, dealers generally cite ‘liquidity’ . . . .”
- “Competition”---but BDs do not change the terms often, so who is the competition?

# What's going on?


- Who are the agents borrowing \$\$ and providing collateral? Hedge funds who want leverage.
- But BDs also need collateral. They source collateral from these agents.

# The Collateral Market

- If the demand for repo goes up, more collateral must be sourced: terms change.
- Collateral more valuable when it is scarce, reflected in convenience yields.
- Convenience yields related to outstanding amounts.


# Demand for Collateral

time t





# Supply of Collateral

## Securities Financing



time t + 3m



# Conclusion

- Interesting paper. First look at secured financing.
- Terms move together; related to market conditions.