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January 20, 2020
We're Number 1! But Why?
A new paper from the Kansas City Fed asks the question, why are U.S. card fraud rates higher than those of other developed countries? Economist Fumiko Hayashi found that even after EMV migration in 2015, the U.S. had a significantly higher in-person card fraud rate than did Australia, France, and the United Kingdom. In all three years studied—2012, 2015, and 2016—the U.S. in-person fraud rate was more than three times higher than that of the other countries (see the chart).
She attributes these differences to three factors:
- The United States had a smaller share of chip transactions. EMV migration in the United States didn't really begin until 2015, compared to years (even decades) earlier for the other countries. According to the Federal Reserve Payments Study, 2 percent of in-person general-purpose card payments used chip authentication in 2015; that share increased to 57 percent in 2018.
- The other three countries use the multi-factor chip-and-PIN verification, which is a stronger method than what U.S. networks use: most chip transactions are chip only. For in-person general-purpose card payments in the United States in 2018, the Federal Reserve Payments Study found that 21 percent (17.8 billion payments) used chip-and-PIN.
- U.S. cardholders are more likely to use credit cards, which typically have higher fraud rates than debit cards.
Hayashi's paper gives a snapshot of the four countries at three points in time. Another approach to doing a country-to-country comparison would be to make a moving picture depicting the aftermath of the adoption of EMV chips for in-person payments. My Retail Payments Risk Forum colleague Doug King, in a paper published in June 2019, looked at the change in in-person fraud for Australia, France, and the United Kingdom and found that fraud rates for in-person transactions dropped after chip-and-PIN implementation. You can see in the figure above that U.S. in-person card fraud rates declined from 2015 to 2016, over the time of EMV implementation here.
Keep in mind that this post is a simplification of two complex papers. For example, Hayashi also analyzed remote card fraud rates. And Doug included some data from other nations. If you want more information, the Federal Reserve Payments Study has reported details on fraud for noncash payments in the United States, cards included, and also authorization methods for in-person general-purpose card payments (see figure 6 in the 2019 Federal Reserve Payments Study). I invite you to read these reports.
July 15, 2019
The Future of Fraud in a Post-EMV Chip Environment
"Doug: Your conclusion has me worried about credit-push in an environment where payments are irrevocable." I received this brief email a few days after my latest paper was published on the Atlanta Fed website. In this paper, I explore fraud trends in countries with a fully mature, or close to it, EMV chip card environment—trends we are likely to see in the United States as our EMV chip card implementation matures.
When the topic of EMV chip card fraud comes up, the conversation nearly always makes its way to the documented shift from counterfeit card fraud to card-not-present (CNP) fraud. While that is a fair and valid conversation, times are changing, and we just may need to refocus the fraud conversation, as this email indicates—my emailer was referring to credit-push payments and the fraud that can happen, and is happening, in this environment.
Data clearly show that when countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Australia migrated to EMV chip cards, CNP fraud rose—in some instances, dramatically. And where the data are available, we can see that the fraud rate for CNP transactions also initially rose. But over the last several years something interesting has happened. Both absolute CNP fraud and CNP fraud rates are declining in some of the countries. While these countries did not have many CNP fraud prevention techniques and tools at their disposal when they first migrated to EMV chip cards, the technology is catching up and they have more tools now. If there was any benefit for the United States from being an EMV laggard, perhaps this is it: we are better equipped to deal with CNP fraud.
But back to push payments. Authorized push payment (APP) fraud, which is a form of credit-push fraud, is a growing problem. In the United Kingdom, the real-time payment system is being used extensively to carry out this type of fraud. Just as other countries didn't have many tools to fight CNP fraud in early EMV chip adoptions, we don't have all the tools yet to mitigate APP fraud.
At the heart of APP fraud is business email compromise, which we've covered in this blog and which was the featured topic in the Atlanta Fed's most recent Economy Matters podcast episode . To read more about this particular fraud trend and other trends the U.S. payments industry should be wary of as our EMV chip card environment matures, be sure to read the paper .
Back to the email I received—it was short, but my reply was even shorter: "You should be worried."
February 4, 2019
So, How Often Do You Dip?
Remember how s-l-o-w dipping your payment card seemed when you were shopping back in 2015? Molasses? Honey? The dregs of the ketchup bottle? These days, I'm dipping more—that is, inserting my card into a chip reader—and complaining about it less. (I don't have a contactless card, so tapping isn't yet an option for me.) I still think swiping is faster, but familiarity means that dipping bugs me less. And it's become rare for me to encounter a jerry-rigged chip reader with the insert slot blocked by cardboard or duct tape, forcing me to swipe instead.
Turns out my shopping experiences—dipping more—line up with new data released by the Federal Reserve Payments Study in December 2018. The study reports some information on how in-person general-purpose card payments were authenticated in the United States in 2017.
For the first time, more than half of these payments by value were chip-authenticated in 2017. In contrast, just three percent of general-purpose card payments used chips in 2015—hence, my lack of familiarity with dipping back in the day. Because contactless chip cards were in use before the EMV-based dipping method began to take off in 2015, these data are an approximation of the increasing use of dipping, not an exact measure.
The chart below is based on figure 8 in the Federal Reserve Payments Study: 2018 Annual Supplement; it shows the substantial uptake in chip authentication at the point of sale from 2016 to 2017. (Check out the supplement for more detail.)
By number, more than 40 percent of general-purpose card payments were chip-authenticated. By card type, credit card payments are most likely to be chip-authenticated and prepaid card payments are least likely to be chip-authenticated (see the chart below). Prepaid cards are less likely to be chip-enabled, certainly a factor in the low shares of chip authentication, in part because of a business decision not to go to the expense of adding chips to low-value cards.
By this time next year, my view of dipping could have changed again. A large card issuer has announced that all its credit cards will be tap-to-pay (that is, contactless) by mid-2019, so it's possible that my dipping will go the way of swiping.
For me, it feels more natural and faster to insert a chip card than it did a year ago. How about you?
By Claire Greene, a payments risk expert in the Retail Payments Risk Forum at the Atlanta Fed
February 12, 2018
If the Password Is Dying, Is the PIN Far Behind?
Back in January, I wrote a post that highlighted the rising incidence of lost-and-stolen card fraud in the United Kingdom. I concluded that the decades-old PIN solution for the card-present environment is now showing signs of weakness. Results of a recent Minneapolis Fed survey of 283 financial institutions offer some validity to my conclusion: the survey found that losses on PIN-based debit increased by 50 percent from 2015 to 2016. In fact, 81 percent of the respondents reported fraud losses from PIN-based debit, compared to only 77 percent for credit cards.
The news wasn't all bad for PIN-based debit. Signature-based debit and credit cards still had more fraud attempts than any other payment instrument. At 63 percent, signature debit fraud actually had a higher increase in fraud losses from 2015 to 2016 than did PIN debit. The PIN is a far superior verification method for card payments, but I'm willing to bet that the PIN, much like the password, has become less effective.
Is this coming at a time when the PIN is about to become more prominent? In late January, the PCI Security Standards Council announced a new security standard for software-based PIN entry, also known as "PIN on glass." This standard specifies the security requirements for accepting a PIN on a mobile point-of-sale device such as a Square card reader.
As an aside, I am a bit surprised by this announcement. Apparently, mobile phones are safe enough for entering PINs, but when someone uses a pay wallet such as Apple Pay or Samsung Pay, the card's PAN, or primary account number, is tokenized for security purposes. I'll save a discussion of this inconsistency for another post.
People have been talking for years now about how the password has passed its prime as a standalone authentication solution. Yet it continues to live, and it's as difficult as ever to mitigate its vulnerabilities. In my opinion, attempts to do so have increased customer friction and had minimal impact. I think the PIN is following a similar path. It creates customer friction (especially for me as I now have different PINs for multiple cards that I struggle to keep straight) and is losing its effectiveness, according to the data I mentioned in the first paragraph. But it appears that, with the PCI's recent announcement, the PIN could become even more prevalent for cardholders. Is it time, in the name of security and customer friction, for us to replace PINs and passwords with more modern authentication technologies such as biometrics?
By Douglas A. King, payments risk expert in the Retail Payments Risk Forum at the Atlanta Fed
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